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Abstract
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union
each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their
behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composi-
tion. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to
weight the votes of the representatives of the dierent countries, states or districts at the
union level? We provide a simple characterization of the eÆcient voting rule in terms of
the weights assigned to dierent districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualied
majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a
model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights
relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council
of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and
contrast them under dierent versions of our model, and compare them to the weights
derived from poll data.
JEL classication numbers: D71, D72
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1 Introduction
Citizens vote occasionally, while their elected representatives vote frequently. This is
sensible due to the cost of becoming informed on a myriad of issues and of involving
full populations in the innumerable decisions that fully direct democracy would require.
As such, a large of part of decisions in democratic unions of nations, states, or districts,
are made by indirect democracy. While indirect democracy is sensible due to the costs
of involving full populations in decision making, it introduces distortions in the decision
process due to the fact that a single vote by a representative does not adequately represent
the heterogeneity of votes that would be cast by that representative's constituency.
To the extent that districts can be made small, of similar size, and of similar degrees
of heterogeneity, and to the extent that representatives' votes are really in line with their
constituents' preferences, then weighting each representative's vote equally provides a
system of indirect democracy that maximizes overall societal welfare. However, for a
variety of reasons, there are many systems of indirect democracy that are not structured
in this way. A particularly important and timely example is the Council of Ministers of
the European Union, a critical decision making body of the EU. That council consists
of a single representative from each country in the European Union. The countries
(represented by a single representative each) dier widely in their population sizes and
compositions. Similar examples, where representatives come from quite heterogeneous
member countries, states or districts, include the United Nations, the US Senate, and
a variety of state and local governments. In any democratic union where the member
countries, states, or districts comprising the union may be of dierent sizes and have
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dierent compositions in terms of distributions of citizens' preferences, it makes sense
to weight the votes of the representatives.
1
For instance, some obvious diÆculties can
result if countries dier in population and their voting power is not weighted. Then,
small countries might impose decisions that a majority of the aected people are against.
How to weight the votes of these heterogeneous countries comprising the current
and future European Union is the topic of an important current debate. Indeed, the
Nice Treaty (2000) and the Constitutional Convention (2003) propose very dierent
sets of weights and voting thresholds for the Council of Ministers of the EU. The Nice
Treaty proposes weights that are less than proportional to population size and a relatively
high threshold for passage (73.9 percent), while the Constitutional Convention proposes
weights that are directly proportional to population size and a lower threshold (60 per-
cent).
2
This leads to a question of what the \right" weights for each of the countries are
and how should the threshold be determined?
With the European Union debate as our leading motivating example, and with many
other important applications in mind, we characterize the set of voting rules that are
most \eÆcient" for an indirect democracy with a priori xed districts. In particular, we
identify the voting rules that maximize the total expected utility of the population of the
union. We emphasize that this perspective is very dierent from the rhetoric that often
underlies political discussions, where the vote by representatives are taken to coincide
with the wishes of the whole of their country. Most of the arguments in the current debate
about Europe are of this sort, and relate to the blocking power of a given country when
facing a decision that the representative dislikes. While such coalitional considerations
may be interesting and are certainly on the minds of the politicians shaping the rules,
it is also important that we know which voting rules maximize overall expected utility,
if for nothing else to at least serve as an important benchmark with which to ground
such a debate. We feel that it is critical to remember that indirect democracy is a proxy
for direct democracy, and that the will and welfare of the citizens should be taken into
account. In a sense, our approach contrasts the view of a \Europe of States" with the
view of a \Europe of Citizens."
One important conclusion of our analysis is that the structuring of the optimal voting
weights and thresholds can be treated separately, with the weights depending on the
diering compositions of countries, and the threshold depending on the general bias in
favor of \no" over \yes". The eÆcient weights can be described intuitively as follows.
Consider the vote by a given representative of a country. Suppose that he or she has
voted \yes" on a given issue. We can then ask the following question. Given the vote
of \yes", what is the surplus of people in the country who favor \yes" over \no"? For
instance if 62 percent of the people favor \yes" and 38 percent favor \no", then 24 percent
more of the population favor \yes" versus \no". Multiplying this percentage times the
1
Alternatively, one can think of adjusting the number of representatives that each country, state, or
district has - and we shall come back to discuss this.
2
The Convention's proposal also includes a requirement that at least half of the countries support a
measure, which could also be binding, but less frequently. We discuss this further in what follows.
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population gives us a measure of how much this country would benet if we choose \yes"
versus \no", and how much this country would suer if we chose the reverse. The eÆcient
voting weight is exactly the expectation of this surplus.
As the general characterization of eÆcient voting rules depends on the expectation
of this dierence between yaes and naes within each country, we also provide a model of
population behavior, which we refer to as the \block model," which allows us to derive
these weights as a function of population size. This works by assuming that a country
consists of a set of voting blocks of preferences, where citizens within a block are similar
and have correlated preferences, while citizens across countries are uncorrelated. This
structure allows us to pinpoint the eÆcient voting weights and thresholds under two
focal scenarios. This then allows us to identify when weights that are proportional to
population would be appropriate, and when a rescaling that is less than proportional to
population would be in order. Our model thus oers some simple tests of the extent to
which, by calculus or accident, the weights attributed to nations in a given union are
eÆcient.
After the development of our theoretical model, the rest of the paper is devoted to
the analysis of the voting systems of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, as
suggested under both the Nice treaty of 2000 and the Constitutional Convention of 2003.
As mentioned above, these voting rules are quite dierent, with the Nice Treaty assign-
ing weights that are less than proportional to a country's population and the proposed
Constitution assigning weights that are directly proportional to a country's population.
We show that these two conicting proposals coincide with the two polar cases of our
\block model" of population behavior. Which set of weights is more eÆcient then boils
down to an empirical question of preference patterns. We analyze some poll data on
citizens' preferences within the EU countries and nd that the data suggest that the
proposed Constitutional weights seem appropriate. There an many reasons that these
poll data should be interpreted cautiously, but this at least shows that such an analysis
is feasible and should be part of the debate. The two proposals also dier in the voting
thresholds they suggest. We emphasize that the optimality of weights and thresholds
can be completely disassociated from each other. Thus, we separately discuss how the
dierent thresholds correspond to dierent hypotheses about the bias of voters in favor
of the status-quo over change.
Relation to the Literature
To us it was surprising that the previous literature had not considered the criterion of
eÆciency (total expected utility) as a guide to determine optimal voting rules for indirect
democracy.
3
While there is literature that relates to indirect democracy, it approaches
the problem from other perspectives. For instance, there is a rich literature in cooperative
3
Rae (1969) analyzed voting rules under this utilitarian perspective of maximizing expected utility
or satisfaction rather than decisiveness (see also Badger (1972) and Curtis (1972)), but in the context
of direct democracy.
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game theory that examines weighted majority games. The main thread there has been to
produce power indices, measuring things such as the relative probabilities that dierent
voters are pivotal. These include the Banzhaf (1965) and Shapley-Shubik (1954) indices,
among others. One central way in which our analysis diers from most of that literature
is that we are interested in total satisfaction in terms of expected utilities rather than a
measure of pivots or what is often called decisiveness.
While some researchers have built power measures on satisfaction and contrasted them
with power measures built on decisiveness (see for instance Dubey and Shapley (1979),
Barry (1980) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2003)), our perspective is still quite dierent.
Most importantly, our aim is not to produce some measure of power or satisfaction
or to compare rules under such measures, but instead to study the optimal design of
voting rules. We provide a full characterization of the voting rules that maximize total
expected utility and show how these relate to the underlying distributions of agents'
preferences, among other things. To the extent that the previous literature has thought
about designing rules, it has focussed on equating the power of agents, rather than
maximizing the total expected utilities of agents. This dates to the seminal work of
Penrose (1946). Depending on the distribution of preferences, these two objectives can
lead to quite dierent voting rules. And, interestingly, maximizing total expected utility
can result in large inequalities in the treatment of individuals across countries. We
provide some results outlining how the asymmetric treatment of agents depends on the
situation.
Perhaps the closest predecessor to the theoretical part of our work is that of Felsen-
thal and Machover (1999), who also study the design of two-stage voting rules from an
optimization perspective. Their objective is to minimize the expected dierence between
the size of the majority and the number of supporters of the chosen alternative.
4
Their
objective diers from maximizing total expected utility in that it does not account for
the surplus of voters in favor of an alternative when the majoritarian alternative is se-
lected, but only accounts for the decit when the majoritarian alternative is not selected.
While these two perspectives dier, they lead to the same weights in the particular case
of large countries of i.i.d. voters, where the weights are proportional to the square root
of a country's population size, as originally suggested by Penrose (1946) from an even
dierent perspective.
The setting with a large number of i.i.d. voters is special and not so realistic -
especially for applications such as to the European Union. Our analysis applies to a
more general model, and we nd that the weights that maximize total expected utility
usually dier from the square root of population size. In particular, we show how the
eÆcient voting rules vary in interesting ways according to the correlation structure of
agents' preferences, as well as the bias for one alternative over another (for instance for
the status-quo as opposed to change), and the behavior of countries' representatives.
This is the rst analysis that accounts for such correlations and other factors that we are
4
See Felsenthal and Machover for an illuminating discussion of their objective, and some of the
imprecisions in the previous literature.
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aware of.
Finally, there is also a literature has examined the European Union's decision-making
and brought ideas from weighted games to assess the relative power of dierent countries
under the Nice Treaty (e.g., see Laruelle (1998), Laruelle and Widgren (1998), Sutter
(2000), Baldwin, Berglof, Giavazzi, and Widgren (2001), Brauninger and Konig (2001),
Galloway (2001), Leech (2002), and some of the references cited there). As the founda-
tions of our analysis of voting rules diers from the previous literature and power indices,
so does our analysis of the Nice Treaty and the new Constitution. Among other things, we
identify conditions on the correlation structure of citizens' preferences that would justify
the various rules that have been proposed, something which does not appear previously.
2 A Simple Example
We begin by presenting a simple example that gives a preview of some of the issues that
arise in designing an eÆcient voting rule. The example shows why in some cases it will
be eÆcient to use weights that are not proportional to population.
Example 1 Non-Proportional versus Proportional Weights
Consider a world with three countries. Countries 1 and 2 have populations of one
agent each. Country 3 has a population of three agents.
Each agent has an equal probability of supporting alternative a as alternative b.
An agent gets a payo of 1 if their preferred alternative is chosen, and -1 if the other
alternative is chosen. Thus, total utility can be deduced simply by keeping track of the
number of agents who support each alternative.
First, let us consider a situation where we weight countries in proportion to their
populations and then use a threshold of 50% of the total weight. That would result in
weights of w = (1; 1; 3) and a threshold of 2.5. This reduces to letting country 3 choose
the alternative.
Here it is possible for a minority of agents to prefer an alternative and still have that
be the outcome. For instance, if two agents in country 3 prefer a, and all other agents
prefer b, then a is still chosen.
Let us compare this to the eÆcient weights - that is, those that maximize the total
expected utility. Here those weights turn out to be (1,1,1.5), and the threshold is 1.75.
Thus, this voting rule is equivalent to one vote per country. The proof that this is
the eÆcient rule comes from our characterization theorem below, but we can see the
improvement in utility directly.
First, note that it is still possible for a minority of agents to prefer a and a majority to
prefer b, but to still have a selected. For instance, this happens if agents in countries 1 and
5
2 prefer a, but agents in country 3 all prefer b. Despite the fact that the rule is not always
making the correct choice in terms of maximizing the total utility, there is an important
distinction between the eÆcient rule and the proportional rule here. Fewer congurations
of preferences under the eÆcient weights lead to incorrect (minority-preferred) decisions.
Let us list congurations that are problematic in terms of agents preferences, where
the last three agents are the agents in country 3.
The only way that a can be the outcome and only be preferred by a minority under
the eÆcient weights is when preferences are (a;a;b,b,b).
However, under the weights that are proportional to population there are three prefer-
ence congurations that can lead to a being chosen when preferred by a minority. These
are (b;b;a,a,b), (b;b;a,b,a) and (b;b;b,a,a).
When we compute the total expected utility (summed across all agents) it is 1.75
under the eÆcient weights compared to 1.5 under the population weights, which reects
this dierence in potential incorrect decisions.
This example is clearly a very stark one. It illustrates some of the ideas that we
will run across in what follows. More generally, the characterization of the eÆcient rule
will depend on many considerations including the distribution of agents' preferences, the
way in which representatives of a country act, and the conguration of countries. In
some cases weights that are proportional to population are eÆcient, while in other cases
non-proportional weights are eÆcient. We now turn to that more general analysis.
3 The Model
Decisions and Agents
A population of agents is divided into m countries.
Country i consists of n
i
agents and we denote this set by C
i
. The total number of
agents is n =
P
i
n
i
.
Although we use the language of a union of countries, the model equivalently applies
to any voting procedure where dierent groups elect representatives who then vote on
their behalf.
These agents must make a decision between two alternatives that we label a and b.
6
A state of the world s will be a description of agents' preferences over the two alter-
natives. In a given state of the world, each agent is either a supporter of alternative a or
a supporter of alternative b. We need only keep track of the dierence in utility that a
agent has for alternatives a and b. Thus, without loss of generality we normalize things
so that agent j gets a utility of s
j
if a is chosen and a utility of 0 if b is chosen.
So, a state of the world is a vector s 2 IR
n
, with element s
j
being the dierence
between agent j's valuations for a and b.
A Two Stage Voting Procedure
The decision making process is described as follows.
The First Stage
In the rst stage, a country's representative decides whether to vote for a or b. This
decision will generally depend on the state of agents' preferences.
We use r
i
= a to denote that the representative of country i will vote for a, and r
i
= b
to denote that the representative will vote for b.
At this point we remain agnostic on how the decision of a representative's vote relates
to the state of agents' preferences.
Possibilities are that the representative is elected with a mandate, or that the repre-
sentative is an existing politician who polls the population, or that the representative is
a dictator, bureaucrat, etc., who might decide on how to vote quite dierently. Later in
the paper we will consider a situation where the \representative" is in fact that, namely
he or she votes in accordance with a majority of the population.
The Second Stage
In the second stage, the representatives from each country meet and vote according
to a weighted voting rule with a qualied majority. In particular, each representative
casts a vote for either a or b. The vote of the representative of country i is given a weight
w
i
2 IR
+
. The tally of votes for a is simply the sum of the w
i
's of the representatives who
cast votes for a, and similarly for b. Alternative a is selected if its tally of weights exceeds
the qualied majority threshold (denoted  2 [0;
P
i
w
i
]), alternative b is selected if the
tally of weights for a is less than the qualied majority threshold, and ties are broken by
the ip of a fair coin.
Let v : IR
n
! f 1; 0; 1g denote the outcome of this two stage voting procedure as
a function of the state. Here v(s) = 1 is interpreted as meaning that alternative a is
chosen, v(s) =  1 means that alternative b is chosen, and v(s) = 0 denotes that a tie
has occurred and a coin is ipped.
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We let V denote the set of all such weighted voting rules with qualied majorities.
The reason that we code v(s) in this way is that the utility of agent j in state s
can now be written as v(s) s
j
.
5
Thus the total utility summed across all agents in all
countries is
v(s)
X
j
s
j
;
and the total expected utility of the union using a voting rule v is denoted
E
2
4
X
j
v(s)s
j
3
5
:
Equivalent Voting Rules
We must recognize that dierent weights and thresholds can lead to the same voting
rule, and so voting rules will only be dened up to an equivalence class of weights and
thresholds.
Beyond dening two dierent pairs of weights and thresholds to be equivalent if their
induced voting rules always make the same choices, we need a coarser requirement for our
main results due to the fact that tie-breaking is not completely tied down under eÆcient
voting rules.
Let us say that a prole of voting weights and threshold w;  with induced voting rule
v is equivalent up to ties to a prole of voting weights and threshold w
0
; 
0
with induced
voting rule v
0
if v(s) = v
0
(s) for all s such that v
0
(s) 6= 0.
This is not quite an equivalence relationship, as it allows v to break ties in a dierent
way from v
0
.
6
To see why we dene equivalence only up to ties consider a simple example. There
are two countries and each consists of a single agent whose utilities take on values in
f 1; 1g. Let w
0
be (1,1) and the threshold be 1. Note that the induced voting rule v
0
would be eÆcient for this example. When things are unanimous, v
0
picks the unanimous
choice, but when s
1
and s
2
are of opposite signs, the rule ips a coin and so v
0
(s) = 0.
Alternative weights w = (1 + "; 1) with a threshold of 1 +
"
2
would also be eÆcient, but
would favor the rst agent in the case of a tie. Thus, its induced voting rule v would be
more resolute than v
0
, but would make the same choices in any case where eÆciency was
at stake.
5
To be careful, this denotes twice the utilities in the sense that s
j
is the dierence between the utilities
for a and b, and this dierence is now doubled in our accounting. We do this to accommodate ties in
voting.
6
This is an asymmetric relationship: v can be equivalent up to ties with v
0
while the reverse might
not hold.
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Equivalent voting weights and thresholds can be rescalings of each other, but also
might not be. For instance with three countries, w = (3; 2; 2) with a threshold of 3:5 is
equivalent to w
0
= (1; 1; 1) with a threshold of 1.5 - they both select the alternative that
at least two countries to voted for.
4 EÆcient Voting Rules
Let us consider the problem of assigning the weights and setting the threshold of the
qualied majority in a manner so that the resulting voting rule maximizes the expected
sum of the utilities of all agents in the union.
In this regard, the best one could hope for would be to choose a when
P
j
s
j
> 0 and
b when
P
j
s
j
< 0. With the two-stage procedure this optimum cannot be achieved. The
reason is that we are losing information in a two stage procedure. In the second stage
we see only the votes of the representatives. This comes only in the form of a vote for a
or b, which includes only indirect information about the preferences of agents.
EÆcient Voting Rules
EÆcient voting rules are those designed to capture as much information as possible.
In particular, we can still ask which v 2 V maximizes
E
2
4
X
j
v(s)s
j
3
5
:
We call such a voting rule an eÆcient voting rule.
4.1 Bias and Threshold Voting
In many contexts, especially where b is interpreted as a status quo, there might be some
asymmetry in the way that we treat alternatives.
Let us say that country i is biased with bias 
i
> 0 if
E
2
4
X
k2C
i
s
k
jr
i
= b
3
5
=  
i
E
2
4
X
k2C
i
s
k
jr
i
= a
3
5
:
A country's bias captures how dierent our expectations are concerning how much the
country's voters care about a over b when their representative votes for a, compared to
our expectations about how much the country's voters care about b over a when their
representative votes for b.
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Theorem 2 Suppose that s
j
is independent of s
k
when j and k are in dierent countries,
and that each country has the same bias factor . A weighted voting rule is eÆcient if
and only if it is a weighted voting rule with qualied majority threshold and weights that
are equivalent up to ties to the threshold

P
i
w

i
+1
and weights
w

i
= E
2
4
X
k2C
i
s
k






r
i
= a
3
5
:
It is important to note that the threshold depends on the bias , while the weights
are determined by the expectations that come from each country. Thus one can judge
whether a rule's weights are optimal independently of the threshold, and vice versa.
We emphasize that there are no assumptions other than the common bias behind this
theorem, and yet we obtain an essentially unique characterization of eÆcient voting rules
and a strong form of separability of weights and thresholds. The proof appears in the
appendix, but is quite intuitive and straightforward. Eectively, the eÆcient decision is
the one that maximizes the expected utility of the population conditional on what can be
gleaned from the votes of representatives. The weights correspond to the expected utility
dierential in a given country based on the observance of the representative's vote. The
voting threshold simply adjusts for the bias of the scaling of what is learned from yes
versus no.
7
Despite its simple proof, we feel that this characterization of eÆcient voting
rules is important. We can see this both in terms of some of its implications, as well as
its application. Before turning to the application to the European Union, let us discuss
a few of the implications of the formula.
First, the extent to which a country's representative's vote is tied to the utilities of the
agents in the country has important consequences. For example, if the representative's
vote was purely random and uncorrelated with the utilities of his constituency, then that
country's weight would be 0. More generally, the closer the tie between a representative's
vote and the population's utilities, the larger the weight that a country receives.
Second, the weights are aected by the distribution of opinions inside a country. In
particular, the correlation structure within a country is an important determinant of the
expected size of the surplus of utilities for one alternative or the other. For instance,
if a country's agents had perfectly correlated opinions (and the representative voted in
accordance with them), then a vote for an alternative would indicate a strong surplus
of utility in favor of that alternative. The more independent the population's opinions
the lower the expected surplus of utility in any given situation. Thus, higher correlation
among agents' utilities will generally lead to higher weights.
7
It is quite simple to see the more general result that would apply if countries have dierent bias
factors. We simply have a \yes-weight" for a yes vote of country i that is E

P
k2C
i
s
k


r
i
= a

, and a
\no-weight" for a no vote by country i which is E

P
k2C
i
s
k


r
i
= b

. We then sum the \yes-weights"
for countries voting yes, and the \no-weights" for countries voting no. The choice is the one with the
higher total weight.
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Third, the eÆcient weights take into account the intensity of preferences. So, relatively
larger utilities lead to relatively larger weights. Thus, a country that cares more intensely
about issues is weighted more heavily than a country that cares less, all else held equal.
Due to practical and philosophical diÆculties with the appraisals of utilities, one might
want to be agnostic on this dimension and just treat all s
j
's equally in the sense of only
assigning them values of +1 or -1. We do this in the following section. Then accounting
for utilities amounts to counting supporters.
Fourth, because of all the things that lie behind the calculations of the weights,
the relation between the size of countries and their relative weights is ambiguous. For
example, a large country with a representative who is a dictator whose vote is uncorrelated
with his population's preferences receives a smaller weight than a smaller country with
a representative whose vote is very responsive to his population's preferences.
The following example illustrates the relation between bias and the voting threshold,
as well as the separability of weights and thresholds.
Example 3 Bias and Thresholds
Consider three countries. Countries A and B have 1 voter each, while country C has
N
C
voters.
Each voter's preferences over a and b are drawn independently. The s
j
's take on
values either 1 or  v with equal probability.
When v is not 1, then there is a bias in the way that voters see the alternatives a and
b. For instance, when v > 1, then it means that a voter who prefers b, is hurt more by a
choice of a, than a supporter of a when b is chosen.
In this case, the common bias factor across countries is  = v.
Theorem 2 now tells us that the voting threshold should be a fraction of
v
v+1
of the
total weight. As v becomes very large, this means that near unanimity for a is required
to overturn the status quo b. If v = 1, then the threshold is 50 percent.
The voting weights are independent of v: They are w
A
= w
B
= 1 for countries A and
B, and via some straightforward calculations:
w
C
= 2
 N
C
X
x>
N
C
2
(2x N
C
)
N
C
!
x!(N
C
  x)!
:
This can produce some interesting voting rules.
For instance, suppose that N
C
= 7. Then C is much larger than the other countries,
and w
C
= 2:186. However, C's \power" still depends on the voting threshold. If v = 1,
11
then the threshold is 50 percent, and so C is the only country that has a nontrivial vote.
In that case country C dictates. However, if v = 2, then the threshold is 2/3 of voting
weights. Then, a passes if and only if country C and at least one of A or B votes for a.
Either C, or A and B together, can block a and keep the status quo.
This example shows several things: First the separability of how the weights and
thresholds are determined. Here, the weights depend on the relative populations of the
countries, while the threshold depends on the underlying preference structure in terms of
a bias for change versus the status quo. Second, the structure of the voting rule and how
it operates ends up depending in important ways on both the threshold and weights.
A prominent case of interest is one where countries are unbiased. Here there is no a
priori disposition favoring change or the status quo, and hence simple majority rule is
eÆcient, as stated in the following easy corollary.
Unbiased Countries
Let us say that a country is unbiased if
E
2
4
X
k2C
i
s
k
jr
i
= b
3
5
=  E
2
4
X
k2C
i
s
k
jr
i
= a
3
5
:
An unbiased country is one where what we learn about how much a country cares about
a from the fact that the country supports a is the same as what we learn about how
much a country cares about b from the fact that the country supports b.
Corollary 4 Suppose that s
j
is independent of s
k
when j and k are in dierent countries,
and that each country is unbiased. A prole of voting weights and a threshold is eÆcient
if and only if it is equivalent up to ties to the weights
w

i
= E
2
4
X
k2C
i
s
k






r
i
= a
3
5
and the 50% threshold of
P
i
w

i
2
.
In order to apply the theory and calculate weights as a function of a country's popu-
lation, we now introduce a model that is more specic about the distribution of agents'
preferences and how representatives vote.
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5 A Block Model
We now specialize to what we call a \block model" which works as follows.
First, we treat agents' utilities equally, in the sense that we only account for them as
+1 or -1, and will disregard personal intensities. This may be defended on grounds of
practicality, but also more philosophically as an equal treatment condition.
Second, we assume that representatives vote for the alternative that has a majority
of support in their country.
Third, we make the following specic assumptions about the distribution of the util-
ities of agents. We consider a world where each country is made up of some number of
blocks of constituents, where agents within each constituency think alike - that is have
perfectly correlated preferences, and where agents across constituencies think indepen-
dently. We take the blocks within a country to be of the same size.
These assumptions are a stylized version of what we generally see. They reect the
fact that countries are often made up of some variety of constituencies, within which
agents tend to have very highly correlated preferences. For instance, the farmers in a
country might have similar opinions on a wide variety of issues, as will union members,
intellectuals, etc.
By adjusting the size and number of blocks in a country we obtain varying expressions
for the eÆcient weights of that country.
EÆcient Weights in the Block Model
In the block model, we let N
i
be the number of blocks in country i. In most applica-
tions the numbers N
i
are likely to be relatively small. Then letting p
i
be the size of each
block, then we obtain the following expression for the eÆcient weight of country i.
w
b
i
= p
i
2
 N
i
X
x>
N
i
2
(2x N
i
)
N
i
!
x!(N
i
  x)!
: (1)
There are two prominent variations on the block model that we consider in what
follows.
We call the rst variation the absolute size block model. In this variation, blocks are
of a xed size across all countries. In this case, a country's population can be measured
in blocks, and a larger country has more blocks than a smaller one. Here the p
i
's are the
same across all countries.
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We call the second variation the relative size block model. In this variation, all
countries have the same number of blocks, and the size of the blocks in a given country
adjust according the country's population size. Here the N
i
's are the same across all
countries.
Thus, we get the following expressions for the eÆcient weights in the two specializa-
tions of the block model.
EÆcient Weights in the Absolute Size Block Model
Given that the population size of a block (p
i
) is the same across all countries, these
can be cancelled out, and the weights in the absolute size block model, w
a
i
, reduce to:
w
a
i
= 2
 N
i
X
x>
N
i
2
(2x N
i
)
N
i
!
x!(N
i
  x)!
: (2)
EÆcient Weights in the Relative Size Block Model
In the relative size block model, as the number of blocks (N
i
) are the same in all
countries, the dierence in the weights then comes only in how many agents are rep-
resented in a block. When calculating the weights, the weights turn out to be directly
proportional to the population size of the countries. Thus,
w
r
i
= p
i
: (3)
The eÆcient weights for various sizes of countries are given in the following table.
The country size refers to number of blocks for the absolute block model and to some
number of population units (say millions of people) in the relative block model.
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Country Size Weight in the Weight in the
in Units Absolute Block Model Relative Block Model
1 1 1
2 1 2
3 1.5 3
4 1.5 4
5 1.875 5
6 1.875 6
7 2.186 7
8 2.186 8
9 2.461 9
10 2.461 10
11 2.707 11
12 2.707 12
13 2.933 13
14 2.933 14
15 3.142 15
16 3.142 16
17 3.338 17
18 3.338 18
19 3.524 19
20 3.524 20
While the weights in the relative size block model are directly proportional to a
country's population, they are less than proportional in the absolute block model. In
that model they are graphed as follows.
Figure 1 here
We note that for large numbers of blocks, the weights in the absolute block model vary
with the square root of the number of blocks, which is consistent with weights originally
proposed by Penrose (1946),
8
while for small numbers of blocks they diverge from this.
Asymmetries and Non-Monotonicities in Expected Utilities
Our perspective has been to maximize the sum of expected utilities, and in the block
model as we have only looked at the sign of utilities, this amounts to maximizing the
8
See also Felsenthal and Machover (1999), as discussed in the introduction. Here we end up with
similar expressions, but only in one specic version of the block model, and only for large populations
with relatively small blocks, and for quite dierent reasons. More generally, the weights we obtain will
dier from the square root, especially when the number of blocks is small or when we leave the absolute
size block model.
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expected number of agents who are in agreement with the alternative chosen. What we
emphasize here is that this is quite dierent from trying to equalize expected utilities
across agents. In particular, eÆcient rules necessarily treat agents asymmetrically, de-
pending on the size of the country they live. Let us examine this in more detail for the
two variations on the block model.
Let us compare the expected utilities of agents living in two countries of dierent
population size, under the eÆcient voting rule in the two variations of the block model.
Proposition 5 In the relative size block model, agents living in the larger country have
expected utilities which are at least as large as agents living in the smaller country; and
whenever the two countries weights are not equivalent
9
then the agents in the larger coun-
try have a strictly higher expected utility. In the absolute size block model, the comparison
of expected utilities of agents across countries can go either way depending on the specics
of the context.
The proof of the proposition is straightforward. We oer a simple argument for the
relative size block model, and an example showing ambiguity for the absolute size block
model.
In the relative size block model, any agent's block in any country has exactly the same
probability of agreeing with the agent's representative's vote. Thus, the expected utilities
of agents in dierent countries dier only to the extent that their representatives receive
dierent weights. As larger countries have larger weights, the claim in the proposition
follows directly.
To see the ambiguity in the absolute block size model let us examine an example.
Consider a union of three countries. Let us examine the expected utilities of the agents
as we vary the number of blocks in the various countries.
10
9
Two countries weights are equivalent if there exists a set of weights that lead to the same voting
rule where these two countries weights are identical.
10
The calculations are as follows. A agent gets a 1 when his or her preferred outcome is chosen and
a -1 if it is not. For a agent in country 1 in the (1,1,1), (1,1,3), and (1,1,5) cases, there is a 3/4 chance
at least one of the other countries will prefer the agent's preferred alternative and a 1/4 chance that
the other two countries will both favor the other alternative. This leads to 3/4 chance of utility of 1
and 1/4 chance of utility of -1. For a agent in country 3 in the (1,1,3) case, there is a 3/4 chance his
or her preferred alternative will match the country's vote and a 1/4 chance it will not. In the rst case,
there is then a 3/4 chance this will receive a vote from at least one of the other two countries and a 1/4
chance it does not. In the second case, there is a 1/4 chance that the agent's preferred alternative will
still be passed by the other two countries and a 3/4 chance it will not. More generally, it is easy to check
that the agent's ex ante expected utility conditional on his or her country's vote being in the winning
majority is simply
w

i
n
i
, and conditional on his or her country's vote being on the losing side is  
w

i
n
i
.
Then we can just calculate the probability that a given country's vote will be in the winning majority,
given the weights.
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Populations of EÆcient Expected Utility Expected Utility
Countries Voting of a Agent in of a Agent in
in Blocks Weights Country 1 or 2 Country 3
(1,1,1) (1,1,1) .5 .5
(1,1,3) (1,1,1.5)(1,1,1) .5 .25
(1,1,5) (1,1,1.875)(1,1,1) .5 .1875
(1,1,7) (1,1,2.186)(0,0,1) 0 .3125
(2,2,7) (1,1,2.186)(0,0,1) 0 .3125
(3,3,7) (1.5,1.5,2.186)(1,1,1) .25 .15625
There are some interesting things to note here. The changes in voting weights result
in non-monotonicities in expected utilities in several ways. In the cases of (1,1,3) and
(1,1,5), a agent in country 1 or 2 has a higher utility than a agent in country 3. However,
once country 3 hits a population of 7, then its weight is such that the votes from countries
1 and 2 are irrelevant. Thus, a agent would rather be in the larger country when the
conguration is (1,1,7), while a agent would prefer to be in a smaller country when the
conguration is (1,1,3) or (1,1,5). Also, we se that as we increase country 3's population
for 3 to 5, its agents' utilities fall, but then increasing the population from 5 to 7 leads
to an increase in its agents' utilities. This contrasts with decreases in utilities of agents
in the other countries.
This example shows us that there are no regularities that we can state concerning
agents' utilities in the absolute size block model. The diÆculty is that changes in pop-
ulation might dilute a given agents' impact within a country, but might also lead to a
relative increase of that country's voting weight. As these two factors move against each
other, changes can lead to varying eects.
Another issue that we might consider in addition to comparing agents utilities across
countries, is to examine how the overall expected utility varies under eÆcient voting
rules as we change the division of a given population into dierent districts or countries.
This issue is also generally ambiguous, regardless of which version of the block model
one considers. For instance, one might conjecture that if we start with one division of a
population into districts, and then further subdivide the population into ner districts,
we would enhance eÆciency since agents would become closer to their representatives.
However, this is not always the case. To see this note that if we start with a union of
just one district or country, then we essentially have direct democracy. This is the most
eÆcient possible. But then dividing this into several districts or countries would lead
to a lower total expected utility under the eÆcient rule, than having just one district.
Now, if we continue to further subdivide the districts, we eventually reach a point where
each agent resides in a district of one, which brings us back to direct democracy and full
eÆciency! Generally, subdivisions lead to conicting changes: on the one hand having a
smaller number of agents within a district gives them a better say in the determination
of their representative's vote, but on the other hand their representative is now just one
17
among many. This leads to non-monotonicities and ambiguities of the types discussed
above.
6 The European Union
Let us now examine the voting rule to be used in the Council of Ministers of the European
Union under the Nice Treaty (December 2000) and compare it to the eÆcient voting rules
under the variations of the block model.
The following are the voting weights for the European Council of Ministers under
the Nice Treaty for the expansion of the EU from 15 to 27 members.
11
The vote is by
qualied majority. At least 255 of the 345 votes (73.9%) must be cast in approval of a
proposal for it to pass.
12;13
11
The previous weights for the 15 members were 10 for Germany, France, Italy and the U.K.; 8 for
Spain; 5 for Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Portugal; 4 for Austria and Sweden; 3 for Denmark,
Ireland and Finland; and 2 for Luxembourg, with 62 of 87 votes (71%) required for approval of a proposal.
12
There are two other qualications as well: (i) that the votes represent at least 14 of the 27 countries
and (ii) that the votes represent at least 62% of the total population. Calculations by Brauninger and
Konig (2001) suggest that there are relatively few scenarios in which the weighted vote threshold of 255
votes would be met while one of the other two criteria would fail. It appears that the only impact will
be from the population threshold and that this will only involve a few congurations of votes providing
a very slight boost in power to Germany and slight decrease in power to Malta. Thus, for practical
purposes, these additional considerations are relatively unimportant and the voting weights themselves
are the main component of the voting procedure.
13
There are discrepancies in the Nice Treaty in that some statements imply a threshold of 258 votes
and others a threshold of 255 votes. It appears that the correct number is the 255.
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Country Population Votes (i.e., weights)
Germany 82.8 29
U.K. 59.5 29
France 59.3 29
Italy 57.6 29
Spain 40 27
Poland 38.7 27
Romania 22.4 14
Netherlands 15.9 13
Greece 10.6 12
Czech 10.3 12
Belgium 10.2 12
Hungary 10.1 12
Portugal 10 12
Sweden 8.9 10
Bulgaria 7.8 10
Austria 8.1 10
Slovakia 5.4 7
Denmark 5.3 7
Finland 5.2 7
Ireland 3.8 7
Lithuania 3.6 7
Latvia 2.4 4
Slovenia 1.9 4
Estonia 1.4 4
Cyprus 0.8 4
Luxembourg 0.5 4
Malta 0.4 3
Let us examine the eÆcient voting weights and compare those to the actual weights.
The following table provides the actual weights and the eÆcient weights based on two
dierent sizes of voting blocks.
The eÆcient weights in the absolute size block model are calculated for two dierent
block sizes: 1 million and 2 million. So for instance, in the case of 1 million sized blocks,
Germany is seen as having 83 blocks, France as 59, and Italy as 58, etc. This leads to
eÆcient voting weights of 7.3, 6.2 and 6.1 for these countries, respectively.
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Recall that
voting weights are not aected by rescaling. So, we need to rescale the eÆcient weights
to the scale of the actual weights. We nd the scaling factor by regressing the actual
weights on the eÆcient weights (with no intercept). This leads to a scaling factor of
14
Countries with a faction of a block are simply scaled to a corresponding fraction of the eÆcient
weight of 1 for a one block country.
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4.58 for the case of 1 million sized blocks and 9.01 for the case of 2 million sized blocks.
The eÆcient weights reported below are those directly from (2) multiplied by the scaling
factor.
The eÆcient weights in the relative size block model are calculated directly by rescal-
ing the population sizes to best t the actual weights (recall that weights are completely
equivalent under rescalings). The scaling factor here is .58.
Country Population Nice Absolute Block Absolute Block Relative Block
Treaty EÆcient Weights: EÆcient Weights: EÆcient and
Weights 1M Sized Blocks 2M Sized Blocks Constitution
Weights
Germany 82.8 29 33.4 33.4 48.3
U.K. 59.5 29 28.4 27.9 34.7
France 59.3 29 28.4 27.9 34.6
Italy 57.6 29 27.9 27.9 33.6
Spain 40 27 22.9 22.7 23.3
Poland 38.7 27 22.9 22.7 22.6
Romania 22.4 14 16.9 17.5 13.1
Netherlands 15.9 13 14.2 14.3 9.3
Greece 10.6 12 12.4 12.3 6.2
Czech 10.3 12 11.4 12.3 6.0
Belgium 10.2 12 11.4 12.3 5.9
Hungary 10.1 12 11.4 12.3 5.9
Portugal 10 12 11.4 12.3 5.8
Sweden 8.9 10 11.4 9.7 5.2
Bulgaria 7.8 10 10.1 9.7 4.6
Austria 8.1 10 10.1 9.7 4.7
Slovakia 5.4 7 8.7 8.1 3.1
Denmark 5.3 7 8.7 8.1 3.1
Finland 5.2 7 8.7 8.1 3.0
Ireland 3.8 7 6.9 6.5 2.2
Lithuania 3.6 7 6.9 6.5 2.1
Latvia 2.4 4 4.6 6.5 1.4
Slovenia 1.9 4 4.6 6.2 1.1
Estonia 1.4 4 4.6 4.5 .8
Cyprus 0.8 4 3.7 2.6 .5
Luxembourg 0.5 4 2.3 1.6 .3
Malta 0.4 3 1.8 1.3 .2
The Nice Treaty weights compared to the eÆcient weights are pictured as follows.
A regression of the Nice Treaty weights on the eÆcient weights under the absolute size
block model provides an R
2
of 96% for the case of 1 million sized blocks and 95% for
20
the case of 2 million sized blocks (with F-statistics in each case over 600).
15
A regression
of the Nice Treaty weights on the eÆcient weights under the relative size block model
provides an R
2
of .80 and an (F-statistic of 102).
The relationship between the dierent weights is pictured as follows.
Figure 2 here
Discussion and Eurobarometer Data
It is interesting to compare the voting rule under the Nice Treaty to that under the
draft of the Constitution produced by the Constitutional Convention in June of 2003,
which are proposed to take aect in November of 2009 (see Article 24). Under the
proposed voting rule in the Constitution, weights will be proportional to population and
the threshold will be 60% of the total population.
16
Those weights would not be very
eÆcient if the world is well approximated by the absolute size block model, but would
be a perfect t under the relative size block model.
Thus, we are left with an empirical question. If the world is a good match to the
absolute size block model then the Nice Treaty weights are almost perfectly eÆcient, while
if the world is a good match to the relative size block model then the new Constitution's
weights are the eÆcient ones. Of course, these are highly stylized models and it is likely
that the world does not conform to either. While it seems clear that countries such
as Luxembourg and Malta consist of more than one block, it also seems clear that the
smallest countries have fewer voting blocks than the largest ones. This suggests that the
weights should be nonlinear, although perhaps not quite to the level suggested by the
absolute size block model.
While a detailed empirical investigation of voting patterns within the countries of the
EU is beyond the scope of this article, we now examine data that show that such an
investigation is feasible.
The European Union conducts a series of opinion surveys that are designed to gauge
the opinions in dierent countries on topics of importance to the union. This series
is called the \Eurobarometer" (Eurobarometer (2003ab)). These polls are conducted
periodically and consider issues pertinent to the European Union. The advantage of
using these polls is that they ask the same questions to citizens of each of the current
15
As a comparison, the t using weights directly proportional to population is only 81%, and so the
eÆcient weights provide a much closer match to the Nice Treaty weights.
16
The rule is more complicated than this, as it requires at least 50% of member states (at least 14 of
the 27 countries) to vote yes as well as 60% in terms of the weighted voting. Thus, there could arise
instances where 60% of the weights come from fewer than 50% of the countries, in which case the vote
will not pass. While this is an important consideration, as a rst approximation we take the 60% weight
to be the binding constraint.
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and future EU member countries. The samples designed to be representative and the
questions are conduced in face-to-face interviews. The interviews included 16,802 people
in the current member countries and 12,165 people in the future member countries, and
were conducted between October 1 and November 9 of 2003. The disadvantage is that
the polls are inherently noisy, and also that the only questions available are those asked
by the EU, and as such may have some bias in their selection.
17
We examined the most
recent EU Barometer polls, from December of 2003 (Eurobarometer (2003ab)). There
are many questions that allow respondents to express a variety of opinions; and there are
other questions of a \agree", \disagree" variety. As such, we include only those questions
that asked explicitly for an answer of \agree" or \disagree". There are eleven such
questions and they relate to foreign policy, defense policy, and security (the questions
appear in the appendix).
18
We average across questions to get a rough picture of the
expected dierence of j yes - no j.
19
and These results appear in the table below.
17
In particular, the percentage answering \yes" over all questions and all countries is 67 percent.
18
We also looked at questions on the Euro and EU agricultural policies from previous Eurobarometers,
but those questions were only asked of current member countries and so are only a sample of about half
as many countries. The analysis reaches the same conclusions, as there is no observable relationship
between the yes-no and population size.
19
The Eurobarometer (2003a) reports \agree" and \disagree", with the remainder being \I don't
know". We look at agree-disagree. Eurobarometer (2003b) only reports \agree". We estimate average
\I don't knows" from the 2003a data and use that estimate to derive the \disagrees" for the candidate
countries.
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Country Population Average Resulting
j yes - no j Weights
Germany 82.8 53.3 44.1
U.K. 59.5 36.6 21.8
France 59.3 52.4 31.1
Italy 57.6 56.1 32.3
Spain 40 54.5 21.8
Poland 38.7 54.6 21.1
Romania 22.4 44.7 10.0
Netherlands 15.9 55.1 8.8
Greece 10.6 61.6 6.5
Czech 10.3 42.4 4.4
Belgium 10.2 49.7 5.1
Hungary 10.1 52.2 5.3
Portugal 10 52.2 5.2
Sweden 8.9 44.8 4.0
Bulgaria 7.8 41.6 3.2
Austria 8.1 51.2 4.1
Slovakia 5.4 48.6 2.6
Denmark 5.3 42.4 2.5
Finland 5.2 47.5 2.5
Ireland 3.8 55.1 2.1
Lithuania 3.6 45.5 1.6
Latvia 2.4 54.6 1.3
Slovenia 1.9 53.5 1.0
Estonia 1.4 43.5 .6
Cyprus 0.8 70.1 .6
Luxembourg 0.5 56.6 .3
Malta 0.4 48.9 .2
The percent dierence between yes and no is not signicantly related to population,
as we see in the following gure.
Figure 3 here
If we regress the average values of the absolute value of yes-no for each country against
population size, we end up with an insignicant relationship (a coeÆcient of -.007 with a
standard error of .061 and a p-value of .90). These data are thus in line with the relative
block model, and if we examine the induced weights, there are almost perfectly linearly
related to population (except for the outlier of the U.K.).
23
Figure 4 here
While these poll data are noisy enough to give us pause in concluding anything from
the above analysis, it does suggest that estimating weights for countries should be a
feasible exercise.
Let us also discuss the voting thresholds. The threshold under the Nice treaty is
73.9% of the weights - which would be eÆcient if countries have a bias of roughly  = 3.
This indicates a strong bias for the status quo. In contrast, the threshold of 60% under
the Constitution would be eÆcient if countries have a bias of roughly  = 1:5. This is
also a bias for the status quo, but a less pronounced one.
At least two other considerations might lie behind the selection of a voting rule, both
in terms of weights and thresholds. One is its stability. As the rules can be amended,
considerations other than eÆciency enter the long-run picture, as only certain rules will
survive.
20
Another is the issue of fairness or equality. As we have shown, eÆcient weights
do not necessarily lead to the same expected utilities for agents in dierent countries.
For instance Proposition 5 showed that larger countries are favored under proportional
weights in the relative size block model.
In conclusion, in this paper, we have provided a framework for designing and analyzing
eÆcient voting rules in the context of votes by representatives of countries, districts, etc.
We have shown that the model can be directly applied to analyzing voting rules such
as those of the European Union, and that the relative merits of dierent rules reduce to
readily identiable hypotheses that are amenable to empirical testing.
20
See Barbera and Jackson (2000) and Sosnowska (2002) for an examination of the stability of voting
rules.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4: This is a special case of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: Given that countries are biased with common factor , it follows
that for any country i
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An eÆcient voting rule maximizes
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Given the independence across countries, we can write this as
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m
v(r
1
; : : : ; r
m
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It then follows that if we can nd voting weights w and a threshold that maximize
v(r
1
; : : : ; r
m
)
X
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X
k2C
i
s
k
jr
i
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5
(5)
pointwise for each (r
1
; : : : ; r
m
), then these must be an eÆcient weights and threshold pair.
Moreover, if we nd one that leads to a 0 whenever there is indierence between a and b,
then and all eÆcient weight-threshold pairs must be equivalent to such a weight-threshold
pair.
Note that for any given (r
1
; : : : ; r
m
), maximizing expression (5) requires setting v(r
1
; : : : ; r
m
) =
1 when
X
i
E
2
4
X
k2C
i
s
k
jr
i
3
5
> 0 (6)
27
and v(r
1
; : : : ; r
m
) =  1 when
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i
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k
jr
i
3
5
< 0; (7)
and does not have any requirement in the case that this expression is equal to 0.
With an abuse of notation, let us write r
i
= 1 when r
i
= a and r
i
=   when r
i
= b.
We do this based on equation (4), as we can then rewrite (6) and (7) as v(r
1
; : : : ; r
m
) = 1
when
X
i
r
i
w

i
> 0 (8)
and v(r
1
; : : : ; r
m
) =  1 when
X
i
r
i
w

i
< 0; (9)
where w

i
is as dened in Theorem 2.
So, one eÆcient voting rule is sums the weights w

i
, but adjusting them to have a
factor of 1 when the representative chooses a and a factor of   when the representative
chooses b. This is the same as using the eÆcient weights and then having a threshold of

+1
(
P
i
w

i
). Then we ip a coin in the case of a tie. Any eÆcient voting rule must agree
with this one except in the case where this rule results in an expression equal to 0. This
concludes the proof of the theorem.
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Appendix B: Eurobarometers
The Questions from the Eurobarometers are as follows.
The European Union already has a Common Security and Foreign Policy and a Eu-
ropean Security and Defence Policy. There is now a debate about how much further
these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the
following statements? Question 1. The European Union should have a rapid military re-
action force that can be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs
[Rapid military reaction force] 2. When an international crisis occurs, European Union
member states should agree a common position [Common position] 3. The European
Union should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common
European Union position [Own Foreign Minister] 4. The European Union should have its
own seat on the United Nations Security Council [Own seat on the UN Security Coun-
cil] 5. Member states which have opted for neutrality should have a say in European
Union foreign policy ["Neutral" Member states should have a say] 6. Countries which
will join the European Union in 2004 as a result of enlargement should already have a
say in European Union foreign policy [Future Member states should have already a say]
7. European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy
[Independence of EU foreigh policy] 8. The European Union should guarantee Human
Rights in each member state, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some member states
[To guarantee Human Rights in each Member state] 9. The European Union should work
to guarantee Human Rights around the world, even if this is contrary to the wishes of
some other countries [To guarantee Human Rights around the world] 10. The European
Union should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the Eu-
ropean Union [Common immigration policy] 11. The European Union should have a
common asylum policy towards asylum seekers [Common asylum policy]
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